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The Sovereignty of Good1—especially the first essay, “The Idea of Perfection”—is 
often associated with a critique of a certain picture of agency and its proper place in 
ethical thought. There is implicit in this critique, however, an alternative, much richer 
picture. Though her immediate target is the Kantianism of Stuart Hampshire, which no 
longer enjoys the centrality in moral philosophy that it did in Murdoch’s time, a broadly 
Murdochian conception of agency provides just as compelling an alternative to both the 
Humean and Kantian varieties predominant in metaethics today. 
The worry is that Humean and Kantian conceptions of agency are too thin, too 
isolated from everything else that makes for a life. Where the Humean emphasizes the 
complex personal context from which choice and action emerge, she conceives the agent 
as for the most part passive in creating it; where the Kantian emphasizes the activity of 
the agent, she focuses on the moment of choice at the expense of the development, 
maintenance, and improvement of the background ethical awareness through which the 
world is disclosed to the agent as normatively saturated.2 Neither approach accounts for 
 
1 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge, 1971). 
2 These characterizations of “the Humean” and “the Kantian” are simplified for the sake of drawing 
the contrast, and I don’t intend them as portrayals of any particular philosopher. I discuss infra the extent 
to which they do and do not capture important features of leading Humeans and Kantians, especially 
Sharon Street and Christine Korsgaard, and what resources Street and Korsgaard have available to respond 
to the Murdochian critique. See especially n.30. To the extent that the toy Kantian and Humean views I 
invoke are simplified to the point of caricature I hope they are nevertheless valuable as devices for drawing 
out important details of the view I attribute to Murdoch. 
Murdoch herself has in mind, in addition to Hampsire, Hare and Sartre in particular. The contours 
of these debates have of course shifted, but they have remarkably much in common. The lineage from Hare 
to today’s Humean non-cognitivists (and their similarities and differences from cognitivist Humeans; 
constructivist Humeans like Street or reductive realist Humeans like Mark Schroeder) are well-known, and 
Murdoch’s concerns about Sartre’s grounding of ethics in rationally unconstrained acts of choice appear in 
criticisms of Korsgaard, sometimes with Sartre invoked for comparison. See Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the 
Passions (Oxford University Press, 2007); see also Ruth Chang, “Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of 




the ongoing process of setting up the choice space, which by Murdoch’s lights is to miss 
out on what is most important. Making sense of what we have reason to choose is not a 
task that can be understood independently of making sense of how we arrive at the 
normative circumstances that structure our practical possibilities to begin with. Murdoch 
underlines that agency is not a power dormant in us most of our lives, springing into act 
at moments of choice—it is the active aspect of our constant, inner, reflective engagement 
with the world. What emerges from her critique is a more sophisticated picture of agency, 
the ongoing, active work of which turns out to be implicated in ethical vision after all. 
Another under-appreciated feature of Sovereignty is that Murdoch’s account of 
moral progress involves an implicit account of alienation, as the inadequacy of one’s 
practical standpoint to ethically relate oneself to concrete others.3 Murdoch is often read 
as a humanist for whom moral progress begins with simple egoism and ends with loving 
care directed at the individual other, understood as a kind of immediate, ahistorical 
respect for human dignity. There are elements of that sort of view in the text but there is 
also the material for a story about how to get people in view in their concrete, particular 
reality, in social and historical context, and in relation to oneself. 4  Thereby we can 
 
Normativity,” in Reasons for Action, eds. David Sobel & Steven Wall: 243–71 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
3 Neither this feature of Murdoch’s view nor the account of agency play a role in, for example, recent 
articles like Kieran Setiya, “Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good,” Philosophers’ Imprint, vol. 13 (2013), Mark 
Hopwood, “Murdoch, Moral Concepts, and the Universalizability of Moral Reasons.” Philosophical Papers, 
46(2): 245–71 (2017); “The Extremely Difficult Realization That Something Other Than Oneself Is Real: Iris 
Murdoch on Love and Moral Agency.” European Journal of Philosophy, 26(1): 477–501 (2018), or most of the 
essays in Justin Broackes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
(hereinafter “Broackes”). Though Carla Bagnoli’s chapter, “The Exploration of Moral Life,” does discuss 
the positive role of agency in Murdoch’s work, the features that she emphasizes are not those discussed 
here. 
Though most of the essays in the Broackes volume do not deal with the aspects of Murdochian 
agency that I am concerned with, Bridget Clarke’s chapter, “Iris Murdoch and the Prospects for Critical 
Moral Perception,” deals with the relationship between moral and political knowledge in a way that 
overlaps with the discussion in the second half of the paper, and Lawrence Blum’s “Visual Metaphors in 
Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy” touches on some of the same ideas. I discuss both infra—see especially n.40. 
4 The centrality, for Murdoch, of recognizing concrete particularity is discussed in illuminating 
detail by Lawrence Blum in “Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral,” Philosophical Studies, 50(3): 343–
67 (1986), and some of his examples in “Moral Perception and Particularity,” Ethics, 101(4): 701–25 (1991), 
help to draw out the importance of social context. The case of Theresa and Julio is exemplary in this respect: 
Theresa is the administrator of a department. One of her subordinates, Julio, has been stricken with 
a debilitating condition in his leg causing him frequent pain. He approaches Theresa to help work 




understand moral progress less in terms of achieving clarity with respect to timeless 
truths about the human qua human, and instead as a process of getting clear about the 
social and moral world, often in ways that can be unflattering. 
In §II I will try to draw Murdoch’s positive conception of agency out of her critique 
of the then-predominant alternative, and in §III I will try to fill in this picture by seeing 
how it works in her conception of moral progress. My aims here are not purely exegetical: 
I want to provide a reading of the Sovereignty that I find compelling, and in doing so use 
Murdoch to pose a challenge to the orthodox presentation of logical space. I am convinced 
that by reflecting on and somewhat updating Murdoch’s intervention into her 




That Murdoch offers a way to think about agency and its role in the life of a person 
may seem a puzzling suggestion given that she emphasizes her criticism of an agency-
centric moral philosophy, promising to focus on moral contemplation and vision instead. 
On a first glance Murdoch appears to want to make agency all but unimportant, taking a 
backseat to a contemplative picture of morality on which the primary concern is vision. 
Nevertheless, her target is not agency in general, nor the idea that agency is 
important to ethics, but an especially narrow and simplistic conception of agency, 
promoted to the place of exclusive fundamentality in ethical thought. Murdoch’s real 
 
out a plan by which the company and in particular she and his division can accommodate his 
disability. Theresa is unable to appreciate Julio’s disability and the impact it is having on his work. 
While in principle Theresa accepts the company’s legal obligation requirement to accommodate to 
Julio’s disability, in fact she continually offers Julio less than he needs and is entitled to. 
More generally, Theresa makes Julio feel uncomfortable in approaching her and gives him 
the impression that she thinks he is perhaps too self-pitying and should just “pull himself together.” 
It is not that Theresa fails entirely to see Julio as “disabled” and as “in pain,” but she does fail fully 
to grasp what this means for him and fails fully to take in or acknowledge that pain. The level of 
his pain and its impact on his mental state is insufficiently salient for Theresa. (704–5) 
While Blum does not explicitly address the role of ableism in preventing Theresa from seeing Julio clearly, 
he discusses the case with great sensitivity toward precisely this aspect. 
 




target is the image of an isolated will, made vivid in her example of a certain common 
but mistaken conception of morality as a “visit to a shop:” 
I enter the shop in a condition of totally responsible freedom, I objectively estimate 
the features of the goods, and I choose. The greater my objectivity and 
discrimination the larger the number of products from which I can select.5 
The kind of mistake she wants to diagnose involves looking only at the “needle-thin” 
moment of choice—understood in terms of the public action that issues from it—as the 
source of value in the world. According to the simplistic picture agency is identified as 
the capacity for choice, an isolable faculty or power residing in a human creature, a 
“burrowing pinpoint of consciousness, inside, or beside, a lump of being.”6 Nothing else 
about this creature is of any ethical significance beyond the will it supports. 
Because the moment of choice itself is understood as the locus of all value, the 
capacity must act against a background of value-neutral options: “If the will is to be 
totally free, the world it moves in must be devoid of normative characteristics, so that 
morality can reside entirely in the pointer of pure choice.”7 It is not just the rest of the 
human creature that is relevant only insofar as it bears the will, but the whole world of 
mere things that is relevant only because the will operates upon it. 
Finally, agency so conceived is exercised only in the isolated moment of decision, 
and otherwise inactive: “the machinery is relentless, but until the moment of choice the 
agent is outside the machinery.”8 The only thing of moral significance is the “point of 
action,”9 at which “the agent, thin as a needle, appears in the quick flash of the choosing 
will.”10 What happens in between moments of choice is of no more ethical significance 
than the body as the will’s vessel or the world upon which choice is exercised. 
 
5 Sovereignty, 8. Her target here is clearly not just a character in philosophical work on agency, but 
encompasses as well an image of the rational agent, recognizable in popular political and economic 
discourse. 
6 Ibid, 47. 
7 Ibid, 40. 
8 Ibid, 15. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 52. 






Murdoch rejects a picture of agency as a capacity that is dormant until the moment 
of choice, is significant only insofar as it issues in reaching out to pick something, and acts 
against a background of mere things that are simply present to us. Her more sophisticated 
picture is one in which having options before one is already an achievement of agency, 
and the moment of reaching out to pick something is almost an epiphenomenon to the 
whole affair of bringing the value-laden options to awareness—by then the choice has for 
the most part already been made. 
If the metaphor of morality as a visit to a shop illustrates what is wrong in a certain 
way of thinking about agency and its role in ethical life, Murdoch’s famous example of 
M and D captures what has gone missing. 11 The broad strokes of the example are that M 
is a mother whose son has married D, and while M initially forms harsh judgments of D, 
over time she comes to see D in a more favorable light, as a result of an inner effort. 
Certain details of the case are important (sometimes in ways that I think have been under-
appreciated) and I will return to them in due course. But the most obvious point the 
example makes is that morality is not just concerned with what is public—public reasons, 
public actions, public concepts—but in addition and in some ways more importantly with 
what is inner: inner acts, attention, moral knowledge, and the ongoing processes 
obscured by a mistaken emphasis on the moment of choice and action. 
The inner acts Murdoch ascribes to M include reflection, introspection, 
observation, consideration, and an ongoing process of inner struggle. They flow from M’s 
conviction that D is worthy of such reconsideration. M is characterized as “well-
intentioned” and “capable of self-criticism,” and the process begins when she says to 
herself, “let me look again.”12 Thus they cannot be understood as the mere operation of 
the “machinery” of M’s passive psyche—Murdoch notes that it needn’t turn out this way, 
 
11 See Sovereignty, 17. 
12 Ibid. 




that M could instead “[settle] down with a hardened sense of grievance.” 13  That M 
commits herself to the inner struggle is what makes these inner acts and not simply the 
alterations that her outlook undergoes. 
One kind of inner activity upon which Murdoch places special emphasis is 
attention, a concept she borrows from Simone Weil: the “just and loving gaze directed 
upon an individual reality.”14 Murdoch is not entirely clear about this but she appears to 
understand attention not as a specific type of inner act but instead as a sort of functional 
kind: our reflections, observations, introspections, and other inner acts—including inner 
acts of omission that result from ceasing to think in certain ways—pattern together as 
forms of attention when they are directed with loving care upon a particular person. 
Not all inner activity is attention in this sense. We can introspect (perhaps only in 
bad faith) in ways oriented toward rationalizing our own behavior; reflect on things we 
despise, reveling in our disgust rather than challenging it; or carefully observe our 
enemies while we plot revenge. Just as M could have remained unreflective about D out 
of a lack of self-criticism, she could as well have seethed out of spite or jealousy. This 
would be inner activity, and presumably of (negative) moral significance for Murdoch. 
But it would not be attention.15 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, 33. 
15 There are also forms of inner activity that appear to meet the criteria for attention, but which are 
ethically or politically problematic. The phenomenon Kate Manne has dubbed “himpathy” (“the excessive 
or inappropriate sympathy extended to a male agent or wrongdoer over his female victim”), for example, 
involves directing excessive attention to the wrong individual reality. See Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). Perhaps we should say that attention is not always a good 
thing, or perhaps we should say that himpathy is not attention after all: that the social conditions that make 
someone an inappropriate object of sympathy for the same reason make a loving gaze directed upon him 
unjust; a lot depends on how much work justice does in the definition of attention. Compare Miranda 
Fricker’s concept of a credibility surplus. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); see also José Medina, “The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional 
View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary,” Social Epistemology 
25(1): 15–35 (2011). To consider an object of attention in abstraction from his social and political context 
would be to center love at the expense of justice. 
An ethics that takes as its subject-matter decontextualized individuals, relying on a standard set by 
their humanity as such, for example, would be humanistic in the way that I worry Murdoch might be. But 
if we take seriously the idea that justice is a constitutive feature of attention, then taking into account the 
social and political context in which an agent’s relationship with another is situated will be required to 




What individuates inner activity as attention is its object (an “individual reality”) 
and its loving character. It aims at a certain kind of morally crucial recognition, at love 
understood as “knowledge of the individual,” 16  which is the “central concept of 
morality... thought of in light of the command ‘be ye therefore perfect.”17 
That attention aims at knowledge introduces a further purpose of the example, and 
the other of the two likely most remarked-upon: that inner moral activity results in an 
epistemic improvement, a state of clear vision. Moral knowledge is of the real as it is, not 
the idle background of free choice, but normatively saturated. Moral concepts, Murdoch 
explains, don’t move about in a non-normative world but “set up... a different world.”18 
In this context the term “reality” itself “appears as a normative word.”19 
Important in this process is the role of moral concepts. For Murdoch they are 
learned from involvement in public language but refined and developed internally over 
a lifetime. We derive them initially from our surroundings, but “take them away into 
[our] privacy.”20 Refinement of our moral concepts is something like the mechanism by 
which attention reforms our moral vision. M comes to have a new understanding of D in 
which concepts like vulgarity, indignity, and juvenility have been replaced by the newly-
refined concepts of refreshing simplicity, spontaneity, and youthfulness. Presumably M 
would earlier have been incapable of seeing D through these positively-valenced 
concepts, and being able to do so is the achievement of inner struggle. Though doing so 
amounts to seeing D clearly, moral vision is always mediated by concepts.21 
 
establish what clear vision amounts to, and Murdoch’s view certainly provides the resources to make good 
on this approach. I will return to this theme in the conclusion. 
16 Sovereignty, 27. 
17 Ibid, 29. 
18 Ibid, 27. 
19 Ibid, 36. Cora Diamond discusses the converse phenomenon, namely the inability to occupy a 
“life-with-a-concept” once the background conditions of the concept’s full applicability have been lost. Cora 
Diamond, “Losing Your Concepts.” Ethics, 98(2): 255–277 (1988), 266 and following. 
20 Sovereignty, 25. 
21 From a certain perspective this kind of concept-dependence, and in particular dependence on 
concepts that one struggles to grasp, appears to trade off against any kind of realism. This is a much bigger 
issue than I have the space to address here, indeed it is one way of seeing the central challenge taken up by 
John McDowell, whose work is broadly Murdochian in spirit. See John McDowell, Mind and World 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). Moral concepts are, for Murdoch and for McDowell, 





Struggle as Agency 
Taken altogether this story of inner activity, moral vision, and an always already 
normative reality might appear to be an alternative to an ethics of agency. But what is 
crucial here is that it is a story about ethical activity. Indeed, attention, for Murdoch, is 
“the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent.”22 Hers is not a two-stage 
account of what is morally relevant in the life of a person—first inner contemplation, and 
then only after that the act of choice—but a picture of a continuous, active process: “what 
we really are seems much more like an obscure system of energy out of which choices 
and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which are often unclear and often 
dependent on the conditions of the system in between the moments of choice.”23 She 
occasionally refers to this as a picture of human agency but more often as a picture of 
human freedom, which comes to the same thing. 
If inner struggle serves, for Murdoch, as a conception of agency rather than an 
alternative to it, what sort of conception of agency is it? In some ways it is more an 
expansion of the concept than a rival: rather than a capacity that is mostly dormant, active 
only in the moment of choice, agency is an ongoing process from which choices emerge, 
when they do, as a kind of externalization or “outward movement” of the inner process.24 
Rather than acting against a background of inert options (products as givens, present to 
us whenever we glance at the shop shelf) with choice as the source of value, agency aims 
at achieving clear perception of an already normative reality: “freedom is not the sudden 
jumping of the isolated will in and out of an impersonal logical complex, it is a function 
 
connected to virtue, which they both understand as a quasi-perceptual faculty. Virtue is a moral standpoint 
from which things show up for us as demanding a certain response. That the real is saturated by 
normativity (“enchanted,” for McDowell) and that our full possession of moral concepts is required to 
clearly perceive it (what he calls the “unboundedness of the conceptual”) are core commitments of both 
philosophers. See also John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” The Monist 62(3): 331–50 (1979). 
22 Sovereignty, 33, emphasis added. 
23 Ibid, 53. 
24 Ibid, 36. 




of the progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly.”25 And rather than living 
within the creature—itself a mere “lump of being”—the activity of agency is integrated 
in the appetitive, emotional, and locomotive aspects of our embodiment. One of its most 
important effects is cultivation of proper desire, for we are “unified being[s] who see, and 
who desire in accordance with what [we] see.”26 
Compared to a standard conception of agency Murdoch shifts the emphasis away 
from the moment of choice and toward the ongoing process of generating and 
maintaining a context within which choice takes place. As she notes, very little of what 
we do involves stopping to consider the moral pros and cons of the available options, the 
reasons for and against, and making a choice that expresses our freedom. Most of what 
we do, even when we do it consciously, involves asking and straightaway answering, 
“shall I go? Oh yes, I promised to” or simply paying the check at a restaurant when we 
see it set before us.27 Given that we arrive at those rare moments of choice after a lifetime-
so-far of achieving a moral perspective on a normatively structured world, “at crucial 
moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over.28 Still, these outward 
actions are no less the expression of agency: they are expressions of agency precisely 
because it is our agency that is at work all along. 
 
Rival Conceptions of Agency 
Murdoch’s picture of agency emerges from her critique of Hampshire’s, and half a 
century later his is all but forgotten. Today’s Kantians have largely abandoned the 
 
25 Ibid, 23; cf. 36: “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which 
implies that clear vision is the result of the moral imagination and moral effort.” Maintaining that it can 
take effort to put oneself in a position to see value, without treating value as any less real, is a central theme 
of both Agnes Callard, Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), and 
Kayla Ebels-Duggan, “Beyond Words:  Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments.” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 98(3): 623–42 (2019). The idea of clear perception here also works something 
like “practical understanding” in Karl Schafer, “Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding, Noûs, 53(3): 
639–63 (2019). 
26 Sovereignty, 39. 
27 Ibid, 35. 
28 Ibid, 36. 




behaviorism that, according to Murdoch at least, informed mid-20th-century moral 
theory, as well as the flat-footed Wittgensteinianism that appears to begin and end with 
a behavioristic reading of the “private language argument.”29  Nevertheless a broadly 
Murdochian conception of agency provides just as compelling an alternative to both the 
Humean and Kantian varieties predominant in metaethics today.30 
Humeans tend not to emphasize agency as such, instead focusing on the subjective 
context in which choices are made. Given an agents’ values, preferences, attitudes, 
 
29 Murdoch’s own picture is, I think, Wittgensteinian in its own way, and readers of the Philosophical 
Investigations are no longer as likely to find in it a rejection of the idea that concepts could be “taken into 
privacy” and developed in the way Murdoch proposes. See, for example, citations herein to McDowell and 
Diamond, Wittgensteinians if anyone is! 
30 Both Street and Korsgaard themselves—as well as other Humeans and Kantians like Annette 
Baier and Barbara Herman who do not thematize agency in the same way but offer richer visions of moral 
psychology—have more sophisticated pictures than the following discussion suggests. Korsgaard at least 
may be working with a conception of agency that goes some way toward the one I’m proposing, even if the 
“received view” of Korsgaard is considerably more simplistic. For example, Michael Bratman, “Review of 
Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58(3): 699–709 (1998), Alan 
Gibbard, “Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard’s Kantian Lectures,” Ethics 110(1): 140–164 (1999), 
Michael Ridge, Why Must We Treat Humanity with Respect?  Evaluating the Regress Argument,” European 
Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1(1): 57–73 (2005), William FitzPatrick, The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: 
Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity,” Ethics 115(4): 651–691 (2005), and 
Samuel Kerstein, “Korsgaard’s Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 31(1): 23–52 (2001). 
Street’s discussion of attachment in terms of recognizing a value-laden gap between the way the 
world is and the way one wants it to be in has echoes of the sort of value-laden world-making Murdoch is 
concerned with (for more on this see below). See Sharon Street, “Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem 
of Attachment and Loss,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90(1): 161–189 (2016). Note as well that 
Kant himself leaves room for the virtues, and argues for duties to cultivate ourselves (see Part I, Book I of 
the Doctrine of Virtue, in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797)), which Korsgaard takes up in Self-Constitution: 
Agency, Identity, and Integrity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Whatever resemblance they bear to particular thinkers, the Humean and Kantian characters I 
address here are, I hope, recognizable in the collective imagination of metaethics. Beyond those articulating 
what I refer to above as the “received view” of Korsgaard (which does, I think, map quite closely onto the 
toy Kantianism I contrast with Murdochian agency in the body text), the ideas of agency as discrete choice 
and as instrumental rationality with respect to fixed aims and desires exert considerable force on 
metaethical debates. 
My argumentative strategy here somewhat mirrors Murdoch’s own, in that she juxtaposes her view 
against an especially flat-footed Kantianism for the sake of drawing a more vivid contrast, but readers of 
Murdoch have been quick to note that there is more compatibility between her and a more sophisticated 
Kantian on the role of love and attention in ethics. See, for example, Carla Bagnoli, Respect and Loving 
Attention,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33(4): 483–516 (2003), and Melissa Merritt, “Love, Respect, and 
Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics,” European Journal of Philosophy 25(4): 1844–63 (2017). 
Insofar as the Murdochian critique of toy-Kantian agency is effective, it sets a standard that any more 
sophisticated Humeans and Kantians will have to meet. See also Donald Regan, “The Value of Rational 
Nature,” Ethics 112(2): 267–91 (2002), for a similar criticism of the arbitrariness of the Kantian will. For 
example, he asks, “what do this ‘reflecting’ and ‘choosing’ amount to in a world where there are no 
standards of value outside ourselves?” (280). 




desires, or ends, choosing is a straightforward affair of maximizing, applying a bit of 
instrumental reason perhaps, but not contributing much itself to the normative 
circumstances. What the Humean gets right, for Murdoch, is the way that arriving at a 
choice with a rich, complicated, contingent, and personal point of view leaves little room 
for the capacity for choice itself—the rational will—to generate or anoint value. 
Kantians, on the other hand, emphasize the active role that agency plays in 
determining choice and action, bearing ultimate responsibility for value in virtue of 
having the capacity to reflect on possible actions. Kantian agency takes in a world that is 
practically significant only insofar as it causes us to form desires and inclinations, and 
normative only insofar as our ability to step back from desires and inclinations and 
choose whether to endorse them is what makes them reasons. While it is not ultimately 
up to each of us what reasons we have, even the categorical reasons that we necessarily 
share are explained by our agency itself, and not by anything about the context in which 
our agency is exercised.31 
Neither of these pictures is complete by itself, by Murdoch’s lights: choice does not 
take place in a vacuum, generating its own normativity against a normatively inert 
backdrop, nor does the normative context in which we act simply appear to us as given. 
The particular form of awareness we bring to bear on the world does most of the work 
most of the time in determining what we do, but to cast us as passive in its creation is to 
miss the crucial role that agency plays. 
For Murdoch agency is implicated in how we form a moral understanding, in how 
we refine our moral concepts, and in how we cultivate desires. The act of choice is the 
“outward movement” of this inner process but it is only agency becoming explicit and 
concrete, and not the principal work of agency itself. The decision has most of the time 
already been made by the formation of an awareness, in which agency is always already 
 
31 Cora Diamond, “Murdoch the Explore,” Philosophical Topics, 38(1): 51–58 (2010), makes a similar 
observation about the relationship between Murdoch’s anti-Kantianism and Korsgaard’s particular brand 
of Kantianism. 




involved. Agency does not move the person to act in a mechanistic world of mere objects 




At this point I want to depart from the text and make what I hope is a friendly 
suggestion for how to think about this alternative picture of agency: it is one on which 
the characteristic exercise of agency is not choice but the development, construction, and 
transformation of the practical standpoint from which choice emerges. 
The practical standpoint is typically understood as that occupied by an agent, a 
valuer, a creature that acts for reasons as such.33 An individual’s distinctive practical 
standpoint, then, is a set of evaluative attitudes and judgments, a practical identity 
through which possibilities are made reason-giving. Here again we can see Murdoch not 
as presenting a rival conception of a practical standpoint so much as an expansion: what 
this generic characterization leaves out is the way that the development and revision of a 
practical standpoint is integrated into in an agent’s life. 
Further, a practical standpoint is not merely a set of attitudes or judgments—it 
constitutes a distinctive outlook on the world, a way that the world itself is present to 
one. This is just to say both that there is some degree of unity or holism to the content of 
 
32 Insofar as there are any accounts available of how agency is involved in self-constitution, for 
example in Korsgaard, Self-Constitution and Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), and Chang, “Voluntarist Reasons,” and “Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid,” 
Philosophical Studies 164(1):163–87 (2013), they rely on too thin a picture of what agency does, and the role of 
agency not only in making a choice but in constructing a context for choice and action. For Korsgaard, for 
example, “your identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and actions,” Korsgaard Self-
Constitution, 19, and reflection aims only at arriving at a description under which you value yourself, 
Korsgaard, Sources, 100–01. One can see in Chang’s attempt to look beyond choice alone for a source of 
normativity a tacit admission that setting up the choice matters—that’s what “given reasons” do, until they 
run out—but treating them as given misses all of the action. 
33 For general discussions of the idea of a practical standpoint along these lines, see Sharon Street, 
“Constructivism about Reasons,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics III, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau: 207–45 (2008), 
“What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?” Philosophy Compass 5(5): 363–84 (2010), David Enoch, 
“Can there be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism about Practical Reason?” Philosophical 
Explorations 12(3): 319–339 (2011), and Karl Schafer, “Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics: 
Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context,” Philosophy Compass 10(10): 690–701 (2015). 




a practical standpoint, and that while it is personal it is not therefore subjective in the 
strong sense that would exclude there being something outside of ourselves with which 
our evaluative attitudes and judgments put us into contact. Our practical standpoints 
relate us to the world, and to the others with whom we share it. 
Finally, there is a structuring element played by the distinctive moral concepts that 
we rely on as resources in determining our attitudes and judgments. Different sets of 
moral concepts provide for different ways of disclosing the world. 
So, a Murdochian conception of a practical standpoint is as a form of awareness of 
the world—a kind of self-world relationship—articulated through concepts derived from 
public language but refined in subtle ways for each agent, through which a reality outside 
of ourselves can be seen as normatively saturated, and from which choices and actions 
emerge as expressions or “outward movements.” And practical standpoints, in turn, are 
constructed, maintained, and transformed through an ongoing process of inner activity: 
the constant work of agency. This picture synthesizes the Humean and Kantian ones, and 
thereby provides for a more complete account of how a practical standpoint—including 
the work that goes into forming and reforming it, and the choices and actions that it 
produces—can be the locus of ethical self-understanding and evaluation. 
This picture additionally helps to make good on another central feature of the role 
Murdoch ascribes to inner reflection in the life of a moral agent: she warns against a 
conception of morality limited to discrete concerns like keeping promises and paying 
debts, and understands it instead as a constant pursuit of self-improvement, which 
suffuses every part of life. With this conception of agency in mind we can see that lifelong 
ethical task as one of tending to and improving our practical standpoints.34 
Even though her main concern is to dislodge a misleading picture of agency we 
can find in Murdoch an alternative one, as the ongoing process of refining and 
 
34 Contrast again Korsgaard: “there is work and effort—a kind of struggle—involved in moral life... 
the ongoing struggle for integrity...” Self-Constitution, 7, which is to say the struggle to achieve coherence 
among one’s commitments. 




transforming one’s practical standpoint. It is, in my view, an attractive picture, one that 
can make sense of the seamlessness with which our habitual and skillful actions emerge 
from our simply being in a world of significance, and of agency as a feature of human life 
rather than an isolable activity: the embodiment of our capacity to determine ourselves. 
This picture stands on its own as an attractive alternative to those that dominate 
moral philosophy. It is, however, a picture that I am extracting from a particular way of 
thinking about moral progress, with a particular conception of its aim and what stands 
in its way. Given that so far I’ve only offered a schematic characterization of the idea of a 
practical standpoint, to get a bit clearer it will help to work through Murdoch’s own 
conception of moral self-development, to get a sense of the sort of practical standpoint 
that she takes us to begin from and the one that underwrites an ethical ideal. 
 
III 
In this section I want to apply Murdoch’s conception of agency to a picture of moral 
progress. There is, as it turns out, more structure to her account than just the idea of a 
practical standpoint, to be filled in with different commitments, judgments, or sets of 
values—some good, some better, perhaps one ideal. For Murdoch moral progress 
involves moving from an alienated standpoint to a self-consciously social one, where 
alienation and self-conscious sociality are not standpoints exhaustively characterized by 
their contents: they each represent formally different ways of relating to the world outside 
of oneself. Hers is a picture of moral self-improvement on which the movement between 
standpoints is not just a matter of trading in one for another, structurally identical but 
substantively different, but a movement that proceeds by improving the “quality of our 
relations with the world.”35 
For Murdoch, moral progress is a matter of transcending egoism in order to 
achieve clear vision of a normatively-saturated reality. My stalking horse in this section 
 
35 Sovereignty, 95. 




will be an overly simplistic interpretation of this picture; while it is a misreading of 
Murdoch, I think it would be a natural way of developing the same general idea of moral 
progress using the resources provided by the Kantian and Humean approaches to agency 
against which I’ve tried to position hers. 
The simplistic idea is this: that the egoism with which moral progress begins is the 
natural state of a creature whose power of reason is instrumental and whose purposes 
are narrowly self-interested, that what makes the egoistic practical standpoint ignoble is 
its lack of complementary altruistic purposes, and that moral progress aims to generate 
them by carefully attending to the reality of other persons because to appreciate the 
humanity in another brings about a psychological change toward greater altruism. 
Unlike the image of morality as a visit to a shop, which Murdoch herself displays 
as a contrast for the M and D example, she does not explicitly consider this picture of 
moral progress. The essays on moral progress, unlike “The Idea of Perfection,” are less 
focused on rebutting a dominant approach than directly reflecting on themes she finds 
compelling. Still, it is helpful to have in view for the same contrastive purpose, as it differs 
from the one I want to attribute to Murdoch along each axis that interests me. For 
Murdoch egoistic alienation is not a matter of natural self-concern, nor is the ethical 
standpoint achievable independently of reflecting on social context and history. 
 
Alienation 
Murdoch characterizes the enemy of moral progress as the “fat relentless ego,” and 
elsewhere as “fantasy” and “self-focus.”36 It may be tempting to find here an implicit 
theory of human nature as essentially selfish and in need of being overcome, a version of 
the familiar Hobbesian state-of-nature-dweller, homo economicus, the Calliclean in the 
breast of us all. 
 
36 Sovereignty, 51, 57. 




One reason to hope, however, that this isn’t what Murdoch is up to is that she 
cautions against precisely this kind of move in Hampshire, whom she accuses of 
“imposing upon us a particular value judgment in the guise of a theory of human 
nature.”37 And indeed we find in her description of M not an obsession with maximizing 
self-interest but an intersecting set of moralized judgments, in particular class bias. D 
initially appears to M as “unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement... silly and 
vulgar;” 38  M doesn’t like how D dresses, or her accent—she thinks her son married 
beneath him; M’s polite outward behavior is ascribed to correctness; and as she becomes 
reflective about her motives she discovers snobbery and narrow-mindedness. 
True, she is also jealous and protective of her son. But the complex of attitudes and 
judgments with which she begins reflect, for one thing, a concern that could only be self-
interested in a broad sense of “self-interest,” given that D is no threat to her pursuit of 
material gain.39 If M is driven by self-interest at all it is by the drive for honor, status, or 
esteem, and not even her own but her son’s. And it is not at all clear that she is even 
driven by this socially-articulated form of self-interest: Murdoch nowhere describes her 
as concerned with the effects D will have on her or her son’s life, nor properly concerned 
with particular consequences at all. Rather, M’s harsh appraisal of D follows directly from 
the standpoint of a certain social class, defined by custom and manner. M is nothing like 
the image of a Calliclean egoist—her moral failings are the result of inhabiting a 
historically conditioned class position. Her moral failings have a political character.40 
 
37 Ibid, 2. 
38 Ibid, 16–17. 
39 All the more so given that D is, by hypothesis, out of the picture once M’s reflections begin 
40 Blum, “Visual Metaphors,” identifies the political reading of the M and D case but argues that 
Murdoch did not intend it, and that this reflects a more general shortcoming of her work, namely her focus 
on personal fantasy as a source of distorted vision at the expense of investigating the social and political 
sources of the same. He laments that “Murdoch’s moral philosophy shows very little appreciation of the 
social and culture forms of the distorting images that block an appreciation of the humanity and the 
individual reality of other human beings.” 317. Blum may very well be right about Murdoch herself, but 
the reading of The Sovereignty of Good that I’m offering here is one that centers precisely the social and 
political dimension of moral perception that Blum takes Murdoch not to appreciate. As I noted from the 
outset my concern is to draw a compelling picture of moral agency and moral progress out of the text, and 
not to contribute to the project of historical scholarship that concerns itself primarily with what Murdoch 
actually meant to claim. 




If M is exemplary of the kind of self-focused, self-aggrandizing, clouded vision that 
Murdoch identifies as the enemy of moral progress it is not because she exhibits any kind 
of supposedly natural selfishness, but because she cannot see D through her class-based 
social conditioning. She suffers not from innate drive to out-compete her conspecifics but 
from a socialized drive to evaluate others on the basis of class-marked behaviors and 
manners. The point generalizes: the ethical standpoint from which moral progress 
departs is not a natural one but a social one. We are all products of time and place and 
circumstance, we encounter the world from a particular social position, from a particular 
form of subjectivity.41 
The problem with a practical standpoint marked by selfishness, then, is not that it 
is wanting in complementary altruistic impulses but that it obscures “a reality separate 
 
Another reader of Murdoch who has called attention to the political aspect of the M and D case is 
Bridget Clarke, “Iris Murdoch and the Prospects for Critical Moral Perception,” in Broackes. She does so in 
the course of developing, on Murdoch’s behalf, a response to the concern that placing virtuous habits at the 
center of moral theory risks making a sufficiently critical perspective on existing social practices 
inaccessible. She argues that part of moral perception, for Murdoch, is seeing how others are different from 
oneself, often in ways conditioned by social practices: 
For an agent to attend to another person in the Murdochian sense, the agent must grasp both the 
relevant similarities and the relevant differences which obtain between himself and the individual 
to which he attends. In these terms, to attend is to walk the fine line between overestimating and 
underestimating the continuities between oneself and others... The appreciations of similarity 
crystallize in the recognition that he is as real as oneself. The appreciations of difference crystallize 
in the recognition that he is separate from oneself. And this, I want to suggest, is another way to 
understand what it means to perceive another justly and lovingly, in all his particularity and 
complexity, i.e. in the light of the Good as Murdoch conceives it. 238 
She argues that “true (Murdochian) perception of individuals involves understanding the past and present 
position of those individuals within the larger social structure,” 251, which is only possible for agents whose 
practical standpoints are informed by and situated within communal, political practices of critique and 
consciousness-raising. 
While I have some minor disagreements with Clarke I think (and hope) that the view I defend here 
is complementary to, rather than in conflict with hers. In particular I have some reservations with the 
importance Clarke places on seeing similarity, and as I argue just below what we see when we see clearly 
is more than a morally significant subset of the properties others have, but Clarke’s suggestion that the 
individual moral standpoint is conditioned and enabled by social-political resources is congenial to the 
picture of the relationship between morality and politics that I sketch in the conclusion. 
41 Judith Butler, Senses of the Subject (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), offers a similar 
discussion of the ways that agency is conditioned by subjectivity, noting that “I am already affected before 
I can say ‘I’ and that I have to be affected to say ‘I’ at all.” 2. There are further resonances between my 
reading of Murdoch and Butler’s positive vision, including with the way that the context of action is itself 
of ethical significance: “the ethical does not primarily describe conduct or disposition, but characterizes a 
way of understanding the relational framework within which sense, action, and speech become possible.” 
12. 




from ourselves.”42 Her concern is not with the traditional difference between egoistic and 
altruistic motive but with the ways that self-focus can trap us behind a cloud of fantasy, 
the “tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one 
from seeing what is there outside one,” which in turn bears the traces of social and 
political context.43 
Moral improvement—the achievement of moral knowledge—issues from escaping 
fantasy and self-focus, from “detachment” or “suppression of the self,” and from 
“clearing our minds of selfish care.”44 Thus, moral improvement is a process of getting us 
outside of ourselves and into genuine contact with others. If this is what an improved 
practical standpoint consists in, and agency is the ongoing process of improving one’s 
practical standpoint, we can see its activity not just in the production of discrete actions 
but in the ongoing transcendence of mediation by the self and its interests. 
Generalizing from the example of M, alienation from others is not, for Murdoch, a 
matter of unquestioned, natural egoism, but of unreflectively occupying a socially and 
historically conditioned practical standpoint from which others are ethically obscured.45 
 
42 Sovereignty, 46. 
43 Ibid, 57. This is one of the places where Murdoch most clearly diverges from Korsgaard, for whom 
moral failing is explained by making oneself into the wrong kind of agent by endorsing the wrong kinds 
of practical principles—those of self-love, say—rather than having a mistaken understanding of one’s 
world. For the Kantian, defect is a matter of acting on the wrong motives and on the wrong maxims, rather 
than seeing through a distorted conceptual framework. See, for example, Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 162 
and following. 
44 Sovereignty, 64, 82. There are interesting echoes here of Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will 
and Representation (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), who argues that the ethical task is to transcend 
the illusory principium individuationis and recognize our unity with all beings, and of course with the 
Buddhist and Vedic philosophical traditions he draws from. See for example 253: “[the will] sees through 
the form of the phenomenon, the principum individuationis; the egoism resting on this expires with it.” 
Indeed Schopenhauer also employs, sometimes on behalf of classical Indian philosophy, the metaphor of 
clouded vision (for example, 352). On the relation between Murdoch and Schopenhauer, see Roger Crisp, 
“Iris Murdoch on Nobility and Moral Value,” in Broackes, 283–4. 
45 This is a different sense of alienation than the one diagnosed by Bernard Williams, “A Critique of 
Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), as a defect in moral theory, interpreted in terms of a kind of internal, 
psychic disunity. Cf. Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 
73(14): 453–466 (1976). It is also a different sense from the one discussed by, for example, Richard Schacht, 
Alienation (New York: Psychology Press, 1970) and Rahel Jaeggi, Alienation (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), drawing on Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and others, as a defect in social formations, 
interpreted in more metaphysical terms, involving estrangement from one’s essence. Murdoch addresses 
the latter under its Marxian guise, arguing that mid 20th-century socialism lacks a compelling vision of the 




Perhaps, for example, we are alienated by pride rather than narrow, material self-interest, 
and thus unable to see ourselves as complicit in social practices with consequences we 
refuse to acknowledge. Coming to see others clearly, then, might involve overcoming 
prideful self-consciousness, coming to see oneself in social relation to others in ways that 
are shameful (as a snob, say, for M, or as the beneficiary of oppressive power relations). 
It might also or instead involve transitioning from a standpoint characterized by the false 
appearance of having no particular standpoint (Reason as the universal white male, and 
so on) to a standpoint in which one self-consciously relates oneself to others through 
politics and power (sometimes imaginatively casting oneself as a villain—the apologist 
for or beneficiary of injustice, the colonizer, the one on the wrong side of history). 
 
Self-Conscious Sociality 
It is easy to see how social contingency conditions an alienated standpoint—we are 
all socially and historically positioned in different ways, ways that come along with 
distinct ways of having one’s vision clouded—but it is less clear how social contingency 
could condition moral progress, the overcoming of alienation. Plausibly, each alienated 
standpoint is alienated in its own way but clear vision is always the same. 
The first thing to note, however, is that there is more to achieving a standpoint of 
clear vision of others than simply having another person in view. To occupy an ethical 
standpoint involves seeing not just the other but oneself in relation to the other. This kind 
 
nature and costs of being alienated from one’s labor power, which a renewed commitment to theorizing in 
terms of the development and refinement of concepts can help to address. Iris Murdoch, “A House of 
Theory,” reprinted in Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, (New 
York: Allen Lane/the Penguin Press 1998). As far as I can tell, Murdoch’s discussion of alienation there, as 
a defect in economic relations, is only indirectly connected to the kind of alienation I am concerned with 
here. 
I do think that my use of the term has a legitimate claim to capture a part of the phenomenon that 
motivates at least Williams and Stocker, namely that, in the classic cases with which they begin, a part of 
what appears to have been “theorized away” by moral theory is our ability to stand in the right kinds of 
self-conscious relations with others—with spouses and friends for Williams and Stocker, and perhaps with 
those with whom we stand in background moral relations for Schacht, Jaeggi, and their historical 
antecedents (I am considerably less confident about the latter commonality). See Jack Samuel, “An 
Individual Reality, Separate from Oneself: Alienation and Sociality in Moral Theory,” Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) 




of recognition is not just a matter of knowing that another is there or what she is like, but 
of knowing how one stands in relation to her—of knowing her in relation to oneself and 
oneself in relation to her. Ethical knowledge is not the mere discovery of an attribute 
something has (personhood, say) but a self-conscious placing of oneself in a world of 
persons. 
If this is right it suggests that we can have a kind of ersatz knowledge of others 
even through a cloud of fantasy and self-focus—nothing is stopping M from believing that 
D is, for example, a person. In the sense in which the concept of personhood is public it 
paradigmatically applies to creatures like D, and if M didn’t take D to be in the concept’s 
extension we might doubt whether she had even minimal competence with it. But as M 
reworks her moral concepts she arrives at a recognition of D cum ethical self-knowledge. 
Or rather, to recognize D clearly and to understand herself in relation to D are one and 
the same state of ethical vision.46 
This is the first bit of structure I want to add to the idea of moral progress as 
overcoming alienation: it is a movement from an alienated knowledge of others that 
amounts to merely endorsing a proposition that predicates something of another, to a 
self-conscious knowledge of others that places oneself with respect to them. This is what 
achieving clear vision amounts to, and through the process we come into contact with a 
normatively-saturated reality outside of ourselves. 
 
Ideology 
There are a number of ways a standpoint can be alienated but one common factor 
in obscuring our ethical vision of others is ideology: roughly, an implicit system of values 
 
46 The status of personhood is of course not what is at issue in the M and D case; the unsuitable 
concepts through which M initially sees D pick out specific, judgment-laced ethical features, and the 
concepts through which M comes to see D clearly equally so. The point I’m making here is broader: failures 
of recognition even in the most general sense are not failures to have predicative beliefs with ethical content, 
but failures of self-conscious relatedness through ethical concepts. Given that recognition of personhood is 
the kind of thing that is often thought to do real moral work the example helps to show the broader 
application of my point. 




that disguise relations of power.47 Exactly how to think about overcoming alienation, 
then, is a delicate matter. The most straightforward story to tell is one on which, in virtue 
of occupying a particular social position and therefore starting with a socially-
conditioned form of subjectivity, moral progress amounts to transforming our practical 
standpoints from those infused with ideological biases to standpoints free of any. At first 
we see others only through an ideological haze of stereotypes and assumptions, unable 
to appreciate their individuality. Moral progress is achieved by carefully reflecting on the 
ideology we find in ourselves in order to rid ourselves of it, to see others clearly. 
This story is familiar from a genre of Ideologiekritik that has recently been embraced 
by some political philosophers in the so-called analytic tradition,48 and whatever there is 
 
47  I don’t mean to propose this as the one true definition of ideology, but I think as a rough 
characterization it is a helpful way to see ideology as something that can structure an alienated practical 
standpoint. I should also confess here that I am begging a question I will not raise explicitly until the 
conclusion: whether and to what extent alienation depends on the political context in which one’s naive 
practical standpoint develops. 
I think it is clear in the example of M and D that Murdoch thematizes class bias, and thus to suggest 
that something recognizable as ideology obscures M’s vision of D. Nevertheless, if Murdoch herself is more 
humanistic than I am and thinks of the contribution of political context as one isolable element of alienation 
among many, we can treat ideology in what follows as a stand-in for a broader phenomenon, including 
self-narrative and self-absorption that don’t obviously reflect features of context uncontroversially ascribed 
to politics. We can then read “ideology” in the rest of this section to mean something like moral ideology: a 
value-laden worldview not exhausted by moral theory but concerned with private interactions and not 
wide-scale social negotiation. 
48 Tommie Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,” Philosophical Forum 34(2): 153–88 
(2003), 174, for example: 
Ideologies perform their social operations by way of illusion and misrepresentation. What this 
means practically is that were the cognitive failings of an ideology to become widely recognized 
and acknowledged, the relations of domination and exploitation that it serves to reinforce would, 
other things being equal, subsequently become less stable and perhaps even amenable to reform. 
See also Tommie Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart?’” Journal of Social Philosophy 33(3): 411–20 (2002). Jason 
Stanley, How Propaganda Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015) defends a similar view, on 
which ideology “occludes” widespread injustice and “misleads us about the structure of reality.” 207. Sally 
Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012)—likely the other most prominent analytic theorist of ideology—has a more complex conception of 
ideology, but insofar as she uses “ideology” as a pejorative term her view appears to be one on which the 
ideal would be to escape it. 
Of course neither Shelby nor Stanley think overcoming ideology is easy to achieve through internal 
reflection alone; indeed these ‘restricted’ conceptions of ideology are subtle and sophisticated in their own 
way, and my criticism in the main text is not directed at them per se. Only combined with the Murdochian 
conception of moral progress discussed here would they yield such implausible results. I do, nevertheless, 
think that the Althusserian alternative discussed below is more promising. See Eric Swanson, “Critical 
Notice of Jason Stanley How Propaganda Works,” Mind 126(503): 937–47 (2017), for a criticism of Stanley 
along the same lines. See also Olúfémi Táíwò, “The Empire Has No Clothes,” Disputatio (51):305-330 (2018), 
who glosses recent analytic Ideologiekritik along similar lines, and argues, on that basis, that it is 




to be said for it I am reluctant either to endorse it or to ascribe it to Murdoch. For one 
thing, at least on a particularly naive version, when combined with Murdoch’s account 
of the mechanism of moral progress— inner activity—we are left with the unsatisfying 
suggestion that the solution to political problems is individual moral improvement. If we 
just reflect thoroughly enough we can rid ourselves of ideological illusion, revealing the 
world as it really is, free of ideology. 
There are a number of reasons to push against this picture. The idea of individual, 
moral solutions to political problems involves a distastefully naive kind of humanism—
ideology becomes all too easy to unlearn, and the self-other relations that come to self-
consciousness have no content of their own. (Could introspection really get us that far? I 
doubt it.) And for my own part I’ll just confess that I’m much more attracted to an 
Althusserian approach to Ideologikritik, captured by the slogan “ideology has no 
outside,” which strikes me as appropriately modest and realistic.49 
My own commitments aside, however, there is some reason to doubt that Murdoch 
would accept the equation of clarity with escaping ideology. For one thing she opens “On 
‘God’ and ‘Good’” with the plea for “a moral philosophy which can speak significantly 
of Freud and Marx, and out of which aesthetic and political views can be generated.”50 
She explores aesthetics throughout Sovereignty, but nowhere explicitly returns to 
politics.51 One hopes, however, that she wants moral theory to generate political views 
 
inadequate to play such central a role in political theory and practice. I largely agree with Táíwò’s criticism. 
The more capacious conception of ideology I advance (which is tied to practice, thus synthesizing the 
doxastic conception of ideology Táíwò opposes and the “practice first” approach he opposes to it), along 
with the more modest role I ascribe to it vis-à-vis political progress, should hopefully allay his concerns. 
49 See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and 
Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), and compare Quill Kukla, “Slurs, Interpellation, and 
Ideology,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 56: 1–26 (2018). 
50 Sovereignty, 45. 
51  Nowhere, that is, within the three essays that constitute Sovereignty; Murdoch does discuss 
politics and its relationship to ethics elsewhere, especially in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: 
Penguin Press, 1993). Indeed much of what I say in this section and in what follows at least superficially 
conflicts with Murdoch’s attitude toward politics in other work. For example, she notes there that “we do 
not ‘live’ the world of politics in the way we ‘live’ our private lives,” 744, which suggests that she sees the 
interpersonal dimension of morality and involvement in social movements, institutions, and other forms 
of engagement with the process of reforming the social world as playing different roles in the lives of 
individual agents. My aim here is to propose and apply a reading of Murdochian agency as elaborated in 




with more sophistication than the proviso achieve enlightenment by escaping ideology through 
personal reflection. A virtue of the reading I’m sketching here (or at any rate, a feature that 
I see as a virtue) is that it makes room for a more reciprocal relationship between moral 
and political thought than the more common, foundationalist picture of politics as 
applied ethics. 
Finally, this picture leaves out the role Murdoch ascribes with great emphasis to 
the development and refinement of moral concepts. Appreciating the role of moral 
concepts may be key both to declining to attribute to Murdoch the picture of moral 
progress as tracing an arc from selfishness to a-historical altruism, and to exploring an 
alternative. Recall that the process of transforming our practical standpoint consists inter 
alia of taking once-public concepts and working them into a more nuanced apparatus for 
disclosing the world to us. For Murdoch the inner effort of agency has the ultimate aim 
of making itself obsolete: we work to get our concepts in order so that they become 
invisible in disclosing the world to us. 
 
The Theory-Ladenness of Clear Vision 
The task for agency, then, is to overcome the distinction between the inner and the 
real. The real is saturated by normativity but it takes a constant inner effort to see it 
through the haze of self-interest and fantasy. But the aim of that inner struggle, of the 
agential ordering of attention and development of adequate moral concepts, has the aim 
of making itself invisible. If correct perception occasions right action then to achieve this 
kind of perceptual contact with a normatively saturated world of others, invisibly 
mediated by the outcome of a constant active effort, is to make moral action natural, to 
 
Sovereignty, and a detailed discussion of Murdoch’s stance toward politics more generally would be beyond 
the scope of this paper. See Clarke, “Critical Moral Perception,” and “Imagination and Politics in Iris 
Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy,” Philosophical Papers 35(3): 387–411 (2006), for discussion of the political 
dimension of individual morality in Murdoch’s work more broadly. See also E. M. Hernandez, “Gender 
Affirmation and Loving Attention,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy (forthcoming), for a quasi-
political application of Murdoch’s conception of attention (political insofar as gender affirmation is a 
heavily politicized topic, and the issues surrounding it are only legible against that background). 




make one a part of the world—a different world, “set up” by moral concepts, as we saw 
above—in which one is embedded and with which one interacts. 
Nevertheless, achieving a moral standpoint amounts to developing adequate 
concepts. It is the achievement of a process of conceptual development. Thus, even as our 
moral concepts fall away at the point of clear vision there is still a sense in which they are 
operative, in which clear vision is a matter of conceptually-mediated awareness of others 
that makes our social relations into a part of how we see ourselves. This looks like a case 
of “theory-laden” awareness, where clarity and conceptual mediation are not exclusive 
but complementary. The moral standpoint involves a better theory, one that that gets us 
outside of ourselves and into reflective contact with a world, but no less conceptually 
articulated. This kind of theory-ladenness is a close cousin of ideology, and if this is right 
moral progress propels us toward a standpoint that is no less political than the one with 
which we began. 52 
To overcome alienation, then, is often to divest oneself of socially-based moral 
illusion—the illusion that one deserves what one has, say, or that more moral progress 
has taken place than really has. Importantly, on the Murdochian picture this does not 
happen automatically, and some people will remain alienated from this bit of social 
 
52 A perennial temptation among philosophers urges that we can clearly distinguish the descriptive 
content of perception, which is theory-independent, from the evaluative content, which supervenes on the 
descriptive (or the natural, the material, or the non-evaluative). The kind of theory-ladenness I attribute to 
Murdoch here, however, is well-captured in Sturgeon’s arguments that even perception of empirical 
phenomena is theory-laden, and in precisely the same way as that in which evaluative concepts saturate 
our perceptual relationship with the world. See Nicholas Sturgeon, “Moral explanation,” in Essays on Moral 
Realism, ed. Geoff Sayre-McCord (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Indeed his discussion of the case 
of Mary and Jane in “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24(1): 
69–78 (1986), 74, echoes Murdoch’s description of the moment at which M decides to “look again” and 
thereby (eventually) comes to see D differently. See also Nicholas Sturgeon, “Doubts About the 
Supervenience of the Ethical,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics IV, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), for related doubts about supervenience. 
Murdoch is more explicit about endorsing something like this in “Symposium: Vision and Choice 
in Morality,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 30(1): 32–58 (1956), where she claims that different 
concepts may “[decide] the relevance of the facts and may, indeed, render them observable,” that “if the 
concept is withdrawn we are not left with the same situation or the same facts,” and that “if moral concepts 
are regarded as deep moral configurations of the world, rather than as lines drawn around separable factual 
areas, then there will be no facts ‘behind them.’” 54–5. 




reality. Being presented with evidence—say, of routine police brutality in black 
neighborhoods—is never enough without reflection. 
The kind of clear vision that one achieves is not just of others qua human but as 
others situated with respect to oneself in historically-contingent ways. We see others 
precisely in our shared social contexts rather than escaping those contexts to a realm of 
pure dignity, respect, or abstract rightfulness. 
 
IV 
I’ve proposed a Murdochian conception of agency as the capacity to occupy and 
transform a practical standpoint, and a schematic Murdochian account of moral progress 
in terms of overcoming an alienated standpoint to achieve a standpoint of clear vision. 
I’ve further suggested that alienated standpoints obscure our vision because of the 
particular way they are ideological, and that seeing oneself in relation to others is still 
theory-laden insofar as it relies on having developed adequate moral concepts. Thus the 
distinction between cloudy and clear vision—between fantasy and reality—is not a 
matter of whether or not one’s relationship with the world is mediated by a socially-
contingent conceptual framework, but the extent to which that framework makes our 
social relations visible to us and allows us to become reflectively self-aware in relation to 
others. 
The result of these kinds of transformations involves coming to understand oneself 
in relation to others not in ahistorical, decontextualized, purely human ways, but 
precisely in ways that are socially and politically realistic, that bring the social, historical, 
and political circumstances in which these relations are embedded into explicit self-
awareness: what is often called consciousness raising. From a standpoint of ethical clarity 
these relations are visible and normatively-valenced—seeing things as they are, socially 
and politically, is not to see them “neutrally,” morally speaking, but to see them as calling 
for response. 




This picture of moral knowledge as socially-situated self-knowledge raises a 
handful of closely connected questions, questions about the content of the moral 
standpoint—that is, about those concepts that are most central to the conceptually-
mediated clarity of vision at which moral progress aims, about the relationship between 
the internal struggle to reach moral clarity and political struggle to improve the social 
relations made self-conscious in it, and about just how much moral progress is possible 
in the span of one lifetime. I don’t have the space here to offer anything like a complete 
accounting of these issues, either on Murdoch’s behalf or my own. Still, I would like to 
conclude with some reflections on the direction in which such an accounting would likely 
go. 
A fairly conventional moral ideal would be to transcend circumstance and social 
position, struggling toward an ahistorical, morally absolute standpoint: a moral view 
from nowhere. As we have seen, however, for Murdoch making social and political 
relations explicit in our understanding of ourselves among others leaves us still trapped 
within them, morally speaking. Through inner activity alone the best we can hope to 
achieve is a realistic view from where we are, with all of its contingency.53 Working to 
change the context that constitutes this standpoint is a matter of politics, and not of moral 
progress alone. The world must be set aright before any of us can truly achieve clear 
moral vision. 
The specter of a certain kind of pessimism looms: the idea that for some of us, born 
in the wrong time or place to have ethical life available, there might just be no point in 
moral struggle—or, with a “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” twist, that 
without hope of ever truly achieving a moral standpoint one must still commit to the 
task.54 More hopefully, however, this picture may recommend appreciating the limit of 
 
53 On the idea that we can allow some contingency into our evaluative standpoints without losing 
our grip on an independent reality, see John McDowell, “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the 
World,” in Pleasure, Preference, and Value, ed. Eva Schaper (New York: Cambridge University Press,1993), 
reprinted in John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
54 See Antonio Gramsci, Letter from Prison (19 December 1929). He uses the phrase in the context 
of political struggle, not a moral one, but as I note just below I think the two combine nicely. 




moral self-improvement alone, without the proper accompaniment of political struggle. 
The idea would be that the inner struggle to achieve morally clear vision and the outer 
struggle to achieve a shared, ethical form of life are complements. Moral progress for the 
individual and political progress advance hand in hand. 
Insofar as inner struggle aims, among other things, to put one in a position to 
contribute to political progress, it might involve cultivating solidarity, becoming an 
accomplice or a comrade, learning to recognize hidden forms of injustice that are made 
explicit and given names as required by circumstance, being liberated from a false sense 
of obligation, discovering that one is entitled to what has historically been sanctioned. 
“Morally correct action,” as Lukács puts it, “is related fundamentally to the correct 
perception of the given historico-philosophical situation,” and often aims to overthrow 
it.55 
For a more concrete example, consider the concept of womanhood, which many 
radical feminists thought depended on a class system that had to be overturned, while 
simultaneously being tactically necessary for feminist organizing.56 More generally this 
can help to explain why concepts corresponding to socially constructed and historically 
marginalized groups can be crucial for political struggle, even if what they denote is an 
essentially unjust social formation.57 The often-used metaphor of “colorblind racism” is 
nicely illustrative: even while the struggle for racial justice plausibly aims to create a 
society in which indifference to race is an aspect of public life, one’s ability to see others 
in relation to a shared social context requires race-concepts, without which one might be 
trapped in a fantasy of justice that has not yet arrived. 
 
55  György Lukács, “Tactics and Ethics,” (1919), reprinted, trans. Michael McColgan (Brooklyn: 
Verso, 2004). 
56 For example, Monique Wittig, “The Category of Sex,” Feminist Issues 2(2): 63–68 (1982). 
57 That temporary allegiances structured by political concepts are crucial for political struggle is 
most explicitly thematized by Haraway, from whom I take important inspiration. See Donna Haraway, A 
Cyborg Manifesto, originally published as “Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s,” Socialist Review, 80: 65–108 (1985). 




All of this will be responsive to the actual social circumstances, and making the 
right concepts available for inner struggle will often be itself a political achievement.58 
Moral progress is achieved through inner struggle but may nonetheless require social, 
environmental, and institutional scaffolding. And likewise political progress may be 
impossible for those trapped behind the veil of fantasy, who watch the dramas of their 
own lives play out with themselves at the center, unwilling to accept a supporting role in 
a political narrative—or who see themselves through the eyes of their social “superiors” 
as mere instruments without moral or political agency of their own. 
A lot remains to be done to make this picture complete, let alone plausible, but here 
are the seeds of what I think is a promising way to think about agency, moral progress, 
and its relationship with politics. The account of agency as the capacity to cultivate and 
transform one’s practical standpoint, and of moral progress as the movement from an 
alienated standpoint to a socially self-conscious one through which we can clearly see 
others in relation to ourselves, are Murdoch’s, and in speculating about the relationship 
between moral struggle and political struggle the basic resources I’ve used are hers. Thus, 
I hope to have made good on my claim that looking again to Murdoch as a neglected 
figure can help us to see some things that we may have been missing. 
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58 One fault line I have so far largely avoided, though I have hinted at it, is that between those who 
take the concept of the human in particular to do serious moral work, and those, like me, who think it is 
almost always either too broad or too narrow. Diamond offers a defense of a kind of moral humanism in a 
broadly Murdochian spirit. See Cora Diamond, “The Importance of Being Human,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 29: 35–62 (1991). 
